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RECENT LEGISLATION
DAMAGES-AUTOMOBILE CoLLISIONs-PENALTIES FOR FAILURE To SETILE
SMALL CLAIMS PROMPTLY-Recent Arkansas legislation provides for double
damages, reasonable attorney's fees of not less than fifty dollars, and court
costs for failure to pay property damage claims arising from automobile
collisions within sixty days after the submission of estimates of damage.
Application of the statute is limited to claims under two hundred dollars. Furthermore, if the defendant presents a "meritorious defense,"
liability under the statute does not attach. Acts of Arkansas (1957), Act 283,
Senate Bill 166.
The ever-increasing number of automobiles on the road, with the attendant increase in the number of minor collisions, has given rise to an
enormous number of small claims. If payment is refused, the time, trouble,
and cost involved in bringing suit on these claims tend to prohibit such
actions. Hence, many small claims are never satisfactorily settled.1 The
Arkansas legislature is the first to attempt to provide a remedy for the
motorist in the form of a penalty statute.2 Several constitutional problems3
are raised by such a penalty statute, all of which have been resolved by
the United States Supreme Court. Such a statute does not violate due
process when the total financial penalty which the defendant risks incurring is so limited that defense is not made impossible.4 A small penalty
is considered to be an inducement to settle, rather than a club in the
hands of the claimant. Furthermore, limiting the application of the
statute to claims arising from automobile collisions does not violate the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The chief constitutional limitation on the application of the statute is the requirement
that the penalty may be invoked only when the amount of the jury's
verdict is equal to or exceeds the amount of the settlement demanded by
claimant from the defendant before the action was brought. 6 Although
1 Small insurance companies, common carriers who act as self-insurers, and the
uninsured motorist are the most guilty in this regard.
2 This may well be the most effective type of remedy for this situation. Small claims
courts could not handle such cases, since the defendant would generally be represented by
counsel. Financial responsibility and compulsory insurance laws offer some protection
against insolvency, but offer no protection against a refusal to pay.
3 U.S. CONST., Amend. XIV: " . . . nor shall any State deprive any person of •.•
property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."
4 Compare Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73 (1907) and Yazoo and
Mississippi Valley R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912) with Chicago,
Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165 (1914), which ·held unconstitutional
a double damages statute where there was no maximum limit to claims to which it was
applicable. The Court pointed out that the penalty sought was not a moderate one.
5 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (19ll).
6 St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 354 (1912); Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Polt, note 4 supra. This due process limitation is
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allowance of the penalty when the out-of-court demand exceeded the
verdict would violate the due process clause, only that particular application of the statute and not the statute as a whole would be struck down.7
The second basic problem is the effectiveness of the statute in view of the
provision that liability will not attach if the defendant presents a meritorious defense. 8 This provision undoubtedly will be interpreted to provide that the penalty does not attach to a defendant who has refused to
pay the claim believing, in good faith, that he has a meritorious defense,
even though the defense proves unsuccessful. 9 Although the author of the
bill apparently intended that only a subjective good faith belief by the
defendant that the defense was meritorious be required,10 the statute
itself does not indicate this and the Arkansas courts will probably require
that his belief also be reasonable. Of even greater importance is the problem of who shall bear the burden of proving whether or not there was a
sufficient belief in the meritorious defense. Since the statute, which fails
to provide any clear indication itself concerning this problem, is in derogation of the common law, it may well be held that the burden of
proof will rest on the benefited party. Such an interpretation would seem to
defeat the very purpose of the statute, that purpose being to make it practicable for claimants to press their just demands. To make suit practicable
the claimant must be assured recovery of the penalty if he is successful.
The burden of disproving that defendant had a reasonable good faith
belief in his meritorious defense would probably result in few suits being
brought. While the claimant's position would be somewhat improved if the
court were to place the burden of proof upon the defendant, claimant
would still be forced to bear the ultimate risk that the defendant could
prove he was defending in good faith. 11 It is suggested that in order to
designed to prevent the plaintiff from using the statute to extort excessive settlements,
i.e., on damages amounting to one hundred dollars, claimant could compel payment of,
say, one hundred fifty dollars by threatening defendant with a two hundred dollar plus
recovery-the double damage penalty plus attorney's fees. The claimant can probably
protect his rights under the statute by securing several estimates of the cost of repair
and then submitting a demand for the lowest amount estimated.
7 Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 233 U.S. 325 (1913); Chicago and
Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35 (1922), noted in 21 MICH.
L. R.Ev. 686 (1923), 23 CoL. L. R.Ev. 185 (1923), 71 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 276 (1923), 32 YALE
L. J. 401 (1923).
8 "[If] the defendant . . . shall, without meritorious defense, fail to pay the
[claim] •.. such defendant shall be liable. . . ." Principal statute, §1. The Arkansas
courts have defined a meritorious defense as one going to the merits, substance, or
essentials of the case. Cooper v. Freeman Lumber Co., 61 Ark. 36, 31 S.W. 981 (1895)9 If "meritorious defense" were interpreted to mean a successful defense, its inclusion in the statute was superfluous, for the defendant would not be subject to the
statutory penalty on a claim against which he had successfully defended, in any case.
10 Private communication from the Hon. Ellis Fagan, State Senator, who was the
sponsor of the bill, dated Dec. 10, 1957.
11 This risk of losing the penalty would -be sufficient to keep plaintiff from bringing
suit on the very small claim, thus denying relief to the man who needs it most.
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carry out the purpose of this statute the meritorious defense provision be
entirely eliminated and the statutory penalty attach in all cases where
the plaintiff proves to be successful.12 By placing all the risk of defending
on the defendant, the claimant would be placed in the favorable bargaining position which this statute envisaged, thus greatly increasing his chances
for out-of-court recovery.13 While in some cases unfairness to the defendant may result, this is outweighed by the need for more adequate protection for the injured party in this area. It is to be hoped that this recent
Arkansas enactment will elicit the interest of other states in passing similar,
but stronger, legislation.

Ralph E. Boches

12 Such a prov1S1on would not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. That the penalty may be applied is merely the risk t:he defendant must
.take if he would rather be sued and have the right to contest the claim than settle out
of court. It is analogous to taxing the costs of the proceedings-which may be considerable if they include the costs of an appeal-to the losing party. "The [defendant]
. is not penalized for taking the controversy into court..•• Repeated judgments of this
court bear witness to the truth that such a tax upon default is not put beyond the pale
by calling it a penalty." Life and Cas. Ins. Co. of Tennessee v. McCray, 291 U.S.
566 at 573 (1934), rehearing den. 292 U.S. 600 (1934), noted in 19 MINN. L. REv. 119
{1934), 82 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 761 (1934).
13 Since the defendant can fully protect himself . by obtaining insurance, placing
the risk on :him does not seem inequitable.

